

~~TOP SECRET~~

DCS/p

3.3(h)(2)

22 September 1960

[Redacted]

3.5(c)

Copy No. C 73

[Redacted]

CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN




DOCUMENT NO. 19
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
TO BE DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010
AUTH: SR 70-2
10 JUN 1980
DATE: _____ REVIEWER: [Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

22 SEPTEMBER 1960

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Soviet officials tell French ambassador that Moscow has not changed its policy on Algeria, but is finding it more difficult to maintain "reserved" attitude.

[Redacted]

①

Peiping announces new agreement on provision of Chinese labor to Mongolia.

②

Shake-up in Ningsia Hui government again points up Peiping regime's continuing problems with various minority groups.

③

II. ASIA-AFRICA

French, concerned over possible Soudanese moves in retaliation for Paris' recognition of Senegal, plan steps to prevent any direct Soudanese aid to Algerian rebels.

④


LATE ITEMS

Situation in Laos.

⑤

Situation in the Congo.

⑥



[Redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

22 September 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC *Livak*

USSR-France-Algeria: Soviet officials have assured the French ambassador in Moscow that the USSR's policy toward Algeria has not changed, and that Moscow's recent propaganda criticism of De Gaulle's handling of the Algerian problem was designed to "appease" Arab governments. [redacted] *no*


[redacted] the Soviet officials warned, however, that it is becoming more difficult for the USSR to maintain a "reserved" attitude because of "pressures from within and without." Although the USSR appears to be less concerned now than last year about avoiding offense to France, and may therefore give stronger support to Algerian rebel demands in the United Nations, it is unlikely that Moscow intends to change its policy in the near future to the extent of recognizing the rebel Algerian government. [redacted] (Page 1)

Mongolia: Peiping has announced the negotiation of a new agreement on the provision of Chinese labor in Mongolia, where there now are 10,000 Chinese workers. This announcement, which comes less than two weeks after the new Soviet loan to Ulan Bator of over \$150,000,000, is further evidence that Mongolia is profiting from Sino-Soviet competition to develop its economy. In May, the Chinese extended a \$50,000,000 loan to cover economic assistance for Mongolia's Third Five-Year Plan beginning in 1961. [redacted] *OK*
Expanded

Communist China: The persistence of separatist tendencies among China's religious and ethnic minorities is highlighted by the shake-up in the government of the Ningsia Hui Autonomous Region, a Moslem area in northwestern China. *OK*
Expanded

i

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]



~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

The chairman (who is also a member of the Chinese Communist party's central committee), a vice chairman, and one other member of the Ningsia governing body were dismissed from their posts last week. The local press accused "nationalist elements" of "confusing nationality and religion" and warned of "severe punishment" for those who fail to reform. China's various minority peoples--which pose a continuing problem but no threat to Peiping--comprise about 6 percent of the population and occupy about 50 to 60 percent of the total land area. [redacted] (See map on opposite page)

II. ASIA-AFRICA

France-Soudan: [redacted] The French Government, concerned over possible moves by Soudan in retaliation for Paris' recent recognition of Senegal, is taking steps to prevent any direct Soudanese aid to the Algerian rebels across the Soudanese Saharan border and to ensure retention of French military bases in the area. French military officers are in contact with the nomadic Tuareg tribes of northern Soudan, and are prepared if necessary to furnish them arms and encourage a separatist movement. A formal statement on Soudan's relationship with the French Community and on Soudanese intentions vis-a-vis Algeria may come from the conference of the ruling Soudanese party now scheduled for Bamako on 22-23 September. [redacted] (Page 3) (Map) } OK

III. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

- A. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the United States or its possessions in the immediate future. no

Note: [redacted]

22 Sept 60

DAILY BRIEF

Page ii

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

- B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action against US forces abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral to the Orbit in the immediate future.

Note: Recent East German moves to assert control over West German access to Berlin and to assert "sovereignty" over the Soviet sector of the city have brought the bloc to a new stage in its efforts to separate West Berlin from West Germany as a part of its program to undermine the Western position in Berlin.

- C. Situations susceptible of direct exploitation by Soviet-Communist hostile action continue to exist in Laos and the Middle East. In Laos, the continuing differences between opposing elements favor Communist exploitation and could stimulate increased Pathet Lao military activity.

LATE ITEMS

*Laos: Prince Boun Oum has notified King Savang that General Phoumi and other military leaders associated with the Savannakhet Revolutionary Committee are prepared to attend a conference of Laos' top military commanders as proposed by the King, but only if the meeting is held in Savannakhet. This in effect amounts to a polite rejection of Savang's proposal and may discourage him from further efforts to mediate the crisis for fear of diminishing his authority. The Revolutionary Committee on 20 September asked provinces loyal to it to nominate delegates to a constituent assembly. This step conforms with previously reported plans to change Laos from a unitary to a federated state. Implementation of this plan presumably will be effected whether or not Phoumi's forces succeed in retaking Vientiane.

no

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

***Congo:** Colonel Mobutu's continued control of the army in the Leopoldville area appears to have put his opponents on the defensive. He has publicly charged Ghana and Guinea with an attempt to restore Lumumba to power and has demanded the withdrawal of their contingents of the UN force. The UAR ambassador, who earlier had made strenuous efforts to destroy evidence of his involvement in the plot, [redacted]

[redacted] "the most important thing" was to "protect Lumumba's life." Mobutu, although his troops control Leopoldville, seems to have been somewhat bewildered by recent events. One observer said he was "like a man in a trance," and the UAR ambassador termed him "confused" and "fanatical."

Meanwhile, UN Secretary-General Hammarskjold, following reports of brutal suppression of unrest in Katanga, is threatening more direct UN action in the tribal warfare in Kasai and Katanga. He has also raised the possibility that local troops might be disarmed by UN forces. [redacted]

(Page 4)

*OK
delete
sentences
3, 4, 5 of P 1
and last
line of
TP 2*

22 Sept 60

DAILY BRIEF

iv

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

USSR's Algerian Policy

Soviet officials, including several allegedly close to Khrushchev, have assured French Ambassador Dejean in Moscow that the USSR's policy toward Algeria has not changed and that recent propaganda criticism of De Gaulle's handling of the Algerian problem is designed to "appease" Arab governments,

[REDACTED] The ambassador was informed that visiting Algerian rebel leaders were told last spring they should not count on material support from the USSR but should instead seek to end the Algerian war by negotiations with Paris. The Soviet officials warned, however, that it was becoming increasingly difficult for Moscow to maintain its "reserved" attitude because of "pressures both from within and without."

These warnings are apparently intended to pave the way for some departure from the Soviet attitude of last September when, in meetings with Arab diplomats in Moscow, Foreign Minister Gromyko and Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin pledged Soviet "moral aid" to the Algerians, but stressed that the USSR was not willing to extend diplomatic recognition to the rebel government because of "international conditions." Khrushchev, in a speech last October, gave cautious endorsement to De Gaulle's Algerian plan, and during his visit to France last spring he publicly expressed approval of De Gaulle's policy.

In recent weeks Soviet propaganda has been more critical of De Gaulle--particularly his handling of the Algerian issue--than at any time over the past year. Moscow now appears to be less concerned about avoiding offense to France and may therefore give strong support in the UN General Assembly to any proposed resolution setting forth the suggestion of rebel Premier Ferhat Abbas for a UN-supervised and -controlled referendum in Algeria.

[REDACTED] the provisional

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

government, in preparation for the General Assembly discussion of the question, is scrapping its policy of deference to Western feelings and has instructed its four-man "delegation" at the UN to seek Soviet support.

It is unlikely that the USSR would risk antagonizing De Gaulle by changing its policy on Algeria in the near future to the extent of recognizing the rebel government. The USSR continues to hope that De Gaulle's ambition and independence will provide Moscow with an opportunity to gain French support for Soviet positions on Germany and disarmament. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]



~~SECRET~~France Concerned Over Possible Soudanese Aid to Algerian Rebels

Paris fears that its recognition of Senegal on 11 September may lead Soudan to retaliate by recognizing the Algerian provisional government and aiding the Algerian rebel military forces. Although Soudanese reaction thus far has been restrained, Soudan might carry out its earlier threat to break with the French Community and force the withdrawal of French troops from Soudanese territory. In that event, France presumably would lose the bases ceded to it by Mali under the cooperation agreements signed last April when Senegal and Soudan were members of the Mali Federation. Loss of the bases at Gao and Tessalit in northern Soudan would make it difficult for France to prevent arms shipments and personnel reinforcements from crossing the Soudanese Saharan border and reaching the Algerian rebels.

French military officers in contact with the nomadic Tuareg tribes of northern Soudan are apparently trying to increase traditional tribal rivalries between them and the Bantu tribes of the center and south, which control the Soudanese Government. The French reportedly are prepared, if the situation warrants, to encourage a separatist movement among the Tuaregs and furnish them arms.

A formal statement of Soudan's relationship with the French Community and on Soudanese intentions vis-a-vis Algeria may come from the conference of the ruling Soudanese party now scheduled for Bamako on 22-23 September.

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]Congo Situation as of 0300 EDT

Colonel Mobutu's continued control of the army in the Leopoldville area appears to have put his opponents on the defensive. After allegedly discovering documents linking Lumumba with "Communists and Guineans and President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana," he has demanded the withdrawal of the Ghanaian and Guinean contingents of the UN force. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Mobutu had told him that Ghana and Guinea had been "caught" supporting Lumumba. As a result, the embassy made strenuous efforts to destroy the evidence of the UAR's involvement in the efforts to return Lumumba to power. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the African states were still following events closely, but that "the most important thing" at the moment was to "protect Lumumba's life!"

[REDACTED] Although Mobutu's troops control Leopoldville and have turned the country's administration over to the new "College of High Commissioners," [REDACTED] the colonel himself remains in the army camp near the city under the protection of a heavy security guard. He seems to have been somewhat bewildered by recent events; one observer said he was "like a man in a trance," and the UAR ambassador termed him "confused" and "fanatical."

Meanwhile, UN Secretary General Hammarskjold, taking advantage of the recent General Assembly endorsement of his Congo policy, is threatening more direct UN action in the tribal warfare in Kasai and Katanga provinces. Following reports that unrest in northern Katanga had been brutally suppressed by Katangan forces, Hammarskjold warned President Tshombé on 21 September that further "repressive measures" would be resisted by the UN forces. He also warned that the activities of Katanga's troops raised the possibility that local troops might be disarmed by UN forces. He stated that the UN action would be undertaken to "protect the civilian population" and that it would be "in no way restricted by rules of non-intervention applied to the force in relation to domestic conflicts." [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~**THE PRESIDENT****The Vice President**

Executive Offices of the White House
 Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
 Scientific Adviser to the President
 Director of the Budget
 Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
 Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
 Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
 Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
 Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
 Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
 The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
 The Secretary of State
 The Under Secretary of State
 The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
 The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
 The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
 The Counselor
 Director, International Cooperation Administration
 The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Deputy Secretary of Defense
 Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
 The Secretary of the Army
 The Secretary of the Navy
 The Secretary of the Air Force
 The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
 The Director, The Joint Staff
 Chief of Staff, United States Army
 Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
 Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
 Commandant, United States Marine Corps
 Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
 Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
 Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
 Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
 Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
 Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
 Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
 The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
 The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
 The Chairman
National Security Agency
 The Director
National Indications Center
 The Director

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~